tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4170623839736191950.post7306829177180478952..comments2022-12-03T19:22:46.911-08:00Comments on Safetymatters: Safety culture information, analysis and management: NRC Regulation of Safety Culture: How They Do ItBob Cudlinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08502712287881656493noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4170623839736191950.post-45815395474257702502015-08-26T12:58:33.640-07:002015-08-26T12:58:33.640-07:00I am still looking for a report of a U.S. nuclear ...I am still looking for a report of a U.S. nuclear power mishap attributed to poor safety culture that would not have been prevented by prudent competent business-like compliance with then existing requirements.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4170623839736191950.post-52336608363375286942015-08-26T11:26:32.985-07:002015-08-26T11:26:32.985-07:00In the pre-ROP era, the NRC held regular Senior Ma...In the pre-ROP era, the NRC held regular Senior Management meetings where they discussed who had been (or was being) bad and how bad. Problematic behavior got a plant on the Watch List. One could argue those meetings generated more current performance indicators than hiding in the office waiting for a plant to get a White finding (lagging indicator) or cross-cutting issue (really lagging indicator). Lewis Connerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08283295941018353006noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4170623839736191950.post-35347801695519728712015-08-24T12:33:17.081-07:002015-08-24T12:33:17.081-07:00During the comment period regarding the Safety Cul...During the comment period regarding the Safety Culture Policy statement I made several explicit comments to the effect that the methods and objectives behind the policy were in fact forcing functions which the licensee would necessarily perceive as limiting its risk tolerance.<br /><br />That said, it is not terribly clear that the situation for licensees has changed all that much from the days before the ROP when an Order Modifying License was a perfectly sufficient way for the NRC to get the attention of licensees toward what are today termed Cross Cutting Issues.<br /><br />Under the ROP the norms of acceptable SC seemingly have been clarified, but I've not seen the longitudinal study that demonstrates how we are better of with sociologist administered surveys over the former practice of having experienced senior staff and consultants conduct comprehensive interviews as the basis for substantive improvement plans.<br /><br />What seems as unrecognized as ever is that attention to Safety Culture is intended to increase the Resilience of the institution in the face of Unanticipated Events, particularly those Unwelcome ones (i.e embarrassing and easy to deny). <br /><br />INPO has long since figured out what it takes to run these plants reliably, even the aging ones - there is lots to observe and measure. However, the deeper currents of loss of collective experience, budget constraints or uncertainty about the future of a plant create kinds of vulnerability which don't directly correlate to the standard measures. <br /><br />My problem with SC has always been that its all about lagging indicators; in that sense I remain doubtful that the costly application of surveys and such is all the beneficial. Bill Mullinsnoreply@blogger.com