Saturday, December 26, 2015

NRC IG Reviews DNFSB Organizational Culture and Climate

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspector General (IG) provides IG services to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), an independent government agency.  The DNFSB organizational culture and climate study* reviewed here was performed for the NRC IG by an outside consultant.

Summary of Methods and Results

The study’s methodology is familiar: Review relevant past reports, develop a survey instrument based on employee interviews and focus groups, administer the survey to all employees and interpret the results.

Themes (issues, shortcomings) brought up during the interviews included DNFSB’s handling of change management, communication, personnel development, leadership, internal procedures and performance management (aka personal recognition). (pp. 6-7)

The report compared the DNFSB survey results with three external norms: a cross-section of U.S. industry, U.S. employees working in Research and Development, and industries that have experienced significant changes with widespread employee impact.  The last group consists of organizations under stress because of reorganization, bankruptcy, layoffs, etc. (p. 14)

The report’s summary is not encouraging: “the general trend shows an unfavorable comparison for the DNFSB on all three external benchmarks, . . . Also, many employees feel they do not have the right tools and resources.  Along with that, 38 percent of employees say they plan to leave DNFSB in the next year.” (p. 4)

The employee survey had 14 categories, higher scores mean greater respondent agreement with positive traits.  Analyzing the survey responses in three different dimensions yielded one typical and two unusual results.  In our opinion, they suggest uneven DNFSB management effectiveness across the organization.

Across organizational groups, the General Manager and Admin/ Support groups scored above DNFSB averages on most categories; the Technical Director and Engineering groups scored below DNFSB averages on most categories. (p. 13)  In our experience, this is no surprise; bosses and admin people are usually more satisfied (or less dissatisfied) than the folks who have to get the work done.

Looking at employee tenure, employees with the shortest tenure scored the highest (this is typical) then the scores go downhill.  The longest tenured employees have the lowest scores, which is unusual; most organizations have a U-shaped curve, with newcomers and old timers the most satisfied. (p. 14)

By pay (GS or DN) level, “what is atypical is that the lowest-scoring group is not the lowest-level group, but instead the mid-level group, . . .” (p. 15)

The report identifies Sustainable Engagement (SE)** as a key category.  Using regression analysis, the authors identified five drivers (other survey categories) of SE, two that had acceptable survey scores and three that are candidates for organizational improvement interventions: communication, leadership and performance management. (p.17)  This is as close the report comes to suggesting what the DNFSB might actually do about their problems.

Our Perspective 


This report recognizes that DNFSB has significant challenges but it contains zero surprises.  It’s not even news.  The same or similar ground was covered by a Dec. 2014 organizational study performed for the DNFSB which we reviewed on Feb. 6, 2015.

Problems mentioned in the 2014 report include board dysfunctionality, communications, performance recognition, change management, frequent disruptive organizational changes, and the lack of management and leadership competence.  The 2014 report  included extensive discussion of possible organizational interventions and other corrective actions.

The NRC IG already knew change management was a serious challenge facing the DNFSB; it was mentioned in an Oct. 2014 IG report.***  That report was likely the impetus for this 2015 study.

The DNFSB has been in apparent disarray for over a year.  New members have been appointed to the Board this year, including a new chairman.  It remains to be seen whether they can address the internal challenges and, more importantly, provide meaningful recommendations to their single client, the U.S. Department of Defense.

Bottom line: This NRC IG consultant’s report adds little value to understanding the DNFSB’s organizational issues or developing effective corrective actions. 


*  Towers Watson, “DNFSB 2015 Culture and Climate Survey: Executive Overview of Key Findings” (Aug. 2015).  ADAMS ML15245A515.  Thanks to John Hockert for publicizing this report on the LinkedIn Nuclear Safety Culture forum.

**  Sustainable Engagement is defined as follows: “Assesses the level of DNFSB employees’ connection to the organization, marked by being proud to work at DNFSB, committing effort to achieve the goals (being engaged) having an environment that support productivity (being enabled) and maintaining personal well-being (feeling energized).” (p. 9)

**  H.T. Bell (NRC) to Chairman Winokur (DNFSB), “Inspector General’s Assessment of the Most Serious Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board,” DNFSB-OIG-15-A-01 (Oct. 1, 2014).  ADAMS ML14274A247.

Sunday, December 20, 2015

Fukushima and Volkswagen: Systemic Similarities and Observations for the U.S. Nuclear Industry

Fukushima
VW Logo (Source: Wikipedia)
Recent New York Times articles* have described the activities, culture and context of Volkswagen, currently mired in scandal.  The series inspired a Yogi Berra moment: “It’s deja vu all over again.”  Let’s look at some of the circumstances that affected Fukushima and Volkswagen and see if they give us any additional insights into the risk profile of the U.S. commercial nuclear industry.

An Accommodating Regulator

The Japanese nuclear regulator did not provide effective oversight of Tokyo Electric Power Co.  One aspect of this was TEPCO’s relative power over the regulator because of TEPCO’s political influence at the national level.  This was a case of complete regulatory capture.

The German auto regulator doesn’t provide effective oversight either.  “[T]he regulatory agency for motor vehicles in Germany is deliberately starved for resources by political leaders eager to protect the country’s powerful automakers, . . .” (NYT 12-9-15)  This looks more like regulatory impotence than capture but the outcome is the same.

In the U.S., critics have accused the NRC of being captured by industry.  We disagree but have noted that the regulator and licensees working together over long periods of time, even across the table, can lead to familiarity, common language and indiscernible mutual adjustments. 

Deference to Senior Managers

Traditionally in Japan, people in senior positions are treated as if they have the right answers, no matter what the facts facing a lower-ranking employee might suggest.  Members of society go along to get along.  As we said in an Aug. 7, 2014 post, “harmony was so valued that no one complained that Fukushima site protection was clearly inadequate and essential emergency equipment was exposed to grave hazards.” 

The Volkswagen culture was a different but had the same effect.  The CEO managed through fear.  At VW, “subordinates were fearful of contradicting their superiors and were afraid to admit failure.”  A former CEO “was known for publicly dressing down subordinates . . .”  (NYT 12-13-15)

In the U.S., INPO’s singled-minded focus on the unrivaled importance of leadership can, if practiced by the wrong kind of people, lead to a suppression of dissent, facts that contradict the party line and the questioning attitude that is vital to maintain safe facilities.

Companies Not Responsible to All Legitimate Stakeholders

In the Fukushima plant design, TEPCO gave short shrift to local communities, their citizens, governments and first responders, ultimately exposing them to profound hazards.  TEPCO’s behavior also impacted the international nuclear power community, where any significant incident at one operator is a problem for them all.

Volkswagen’s isolation from public responsibilities is facilitated by its structure.  Only 12% of the company is held by independent shareholders.  Like other large German companies, the labor unions hold half the seats on VW’s board.  Two more seats are held by the regional government (a minority owner) which in practice cannot vote against labor. So the union effectively controls the board. (NYT 12-13-15)

We have long complained about the obsessive secrecy practiced by the U.S. nuclear industry, particularly in its relations with its self-regulator, INPO.  It is not a recipe for building trust and confidence with the public, an affected and legitimate stakeholder.

Our Perspective

The TEPCO safety culture (SC) was unacceptably weak.  And its management culture simply ignored inconvenient facts.

Volkswagen’s culture has valued technical competence and ambition, and apparently has lower regard for regulations (esp. foreign, i.e., U.S. ones) and other rules of the game.

We are not saying the gross problems of either company infect the U.S. nuclear industry.  But the potential is there.  The industry has experienced events that suggest the presence of human, technical and systemic shortcomings.  For a general illustration of inadequate management effectiveness, look at Entergy’s series of SC problems.  For a specific case, remember Davis-Besse, where favoring production over safety took the plant to the brink of a significant failure.  Caveat nuclear.


*  See, for example: J. Ewing and G. Bowley, “The Engineering of Volkswagen’s Aggressive Ambition,” New York Times (Dec. 13, 2015).  J. Ewing, “Volkswagen Terms One Emissions Problem Smaller Than Expected,” New York Times (Dec. 9, 2015).