Entergy Headquarters |
TVA Headquarters |
Entergy
On March 12, 2018 the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order* (CO) to Entergy for violations at the Grand Gulf plant: (1) an examination proctor provided assistance to trainees and (2) nonlicensed operators did not tour all required watch station areas and entered inaccurate information into the operator logs. The NRC characterized these as willful violations. As has become customary, Entergy requested Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). Entergy agreed to communicate fleet-wide the company’s intolerance for willful misconduct, evaluate why prior CO-driven corrective actions failed to prevent the current violations, conduct periodic effectiveness reviews of corrective actions, and conduct periodic “organizational health surveys” to identify NSC concerns that could contribute to willful misconduct.
On March 29, 2018 the NRC reported** on Arkansas Nuclear One’s (ANO’s) progress in implementing actions required by a June 17, 2016 Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL). (We reported at length on ANO’s problems on June 25, 2015 and June 16, 2016.) A weak NSC has been a major contributor to ANO’s woes. The NRC inspection team concluded that all but one corrective actions were implemented and effective and closed those items. The NRC also concluded that actions taken to address two inspection focus areas and two Yellow findings were also satisfactory.
On April 20, 2018 the NRC reported*** on ANO’s actions to address a White inspection finding. They concluded the actions were satisfactory and noted that ANO’s root cause evaluation had identified nine NSC aspects with weaknesses. Is that good news because they identified the weaknesses or bad news because they found so many? You be the judge.
On June 18, 2018 the NRC closed**** ANO's CAL and moved the plant into column 1 of the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix.
TVA
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted an Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) review***** of Sequoyah during August 14-31, 2017. The team reviewed plant operational safety performance vis-à-vis IAEA safety standards and made appropriate recommendations and suggestions. Two of the three significant recommendations have an NSC component: (1) “improve the performance of management and staff in challenging inappropriate behaviours” and “improve the effectiveness of event investigation and corrective action implementation . . .” (p. 2)
Focusing on NSC, the team observed: “The procedure for nuclear safety culture self-assessments does not include a sufficiently diverse range of tools necessary to gather all the information required for effective analysis. The previous periodic safety culture self-assessment results were based on surveys but other tools, such as interviews, focus groups and observations, were only used if the survey revealed any gaps.” (p. 60)
On March 14, 2018 the NRC reported^ on Watts Bar’s progress in addressing NRC CO EA-17-022 and Chilling Effect Letter (CEL) EA-16-061, and licensee action to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment (SCWE). (We discussed the CEL on March 25, 2016 and NSC/SCWE problems on Nov. 14, 2016.) Licensee actions with NSC-related components were noted throughout the report including the discussions on plant communications, training, work processes and independent oversight. The sections on assessing NSC/SCWE and “Safety Over Production” included inspection team observations (aka opportunities for improvement) which were shared with the licensee. (pp. 10-11, 17, 24-27) One TVA corrective action was to establish a Fleet Safety Culture Peer Team, which has been done. The overall good news is the report had no significant NSC-related negative findings. Focus group participants were generally positive about NSC and SCWE but expressed concern about “falling back into old patterns” and “declaring success too soon.” (p. 27)
Our Perspective
For Entergy, it looks like business as usual, i.e., NSC Whac-A-Mole. They get caught or self-report an infraction, go to ADR, and promise to do better at the affected site and fleet-wide. Eventually a new problem arises somewhere else. The strength of their overall NSC appears to be floating in a performance band below satisfactory but above intolerable.
We are a bit more optimistic with respect to TVA. It would be good if TVA could replicate some of Sequoyah’s (which has managed to keep its nose generally clean) values and practices at Browns Ferry and Watts Bar. Perhaps their fleet wide initiative will be a mechanism for making that happen.
We applaud the NRC inspection team for providing specific information to Watts Bar on actions the plant could take to strengthen its NSC.
Bottom line: The Sequoyah OSART report is worth reviewing for its detailed reporting of the team’s observations of unsafe (or at least questionable) employee work behaviors.
* K.M. Kennedy (NRC) to J.A. Ventosa (Entergy), “Confirmatory Order, NRC Inspection Report 05000416/2017014, and NRC Investigation Reports 4-2016-004 AND 4-2017-021” (Mar. 12, 2018). ADAMS ML18072A191.
** N.F. O’Keefe (NRC) to R.L. Anderson (Entergy), “Arkansas Nuclear One – NRC Confirmatory Action Letter (EA-16-124) Follow-up Inspection Report 05000313/2018012 AND 05000368/2018012” (Mar. 29, 2018). ADAMS ML18092A005.
*** N.F. O’Keefe (NRC) to R.L. Anderson (Entergy), “Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 – NRC Supplemental Inspection Report 05000368/2018040” (Apr. 20, 2018). ADAMS ML18110A304.
**** K.M. Kennedy (NRC) to R.L. Anderson (Entergy), "Arkansas Nuclear One – NRC Confirmatory Action Letter (EA-16-124) Follow-up Inspection Report 05000313/2018013 AND 05000368/2018013 and Assessment Follow-up Letter" (Jun. 18, 2018) ADAMS ML18165A206.
***** IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART), Report of the Mission to the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Aug. 14-31, 2017, IAEA-NSNI/OSART/195/2017. ADAMS ML18061A036. The document date in the NRC library is Mar. 2, 2018.
^ A.D. Masters (NRC) to J.W. Shea “Watts Bar Nuclear Plant – Follow-up for NRC Confirmatory Order EA-17-022 and Chilled Work Environment Letter EA-16-061; NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000390/2017009, 05000391/2017009” (Mar. 14, 2018). ADAMS ML18073A202.