Millstone |
A recent
article* in the Hartford Courant newspaper reported on a turbine-driven
auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump problem at Millstone 3 that took so long to
resolve that the NRC issued a White finding to plant owner Dominion Resources.
The article
included a quote from the Connecticut Nuclear Energy Advisory Council (NEAC)
describing their unease over the pump problem. We dug a little deeper on the NEAC, a state
government entity that works with public agencies and plant operators to ensure
public health and safety. Their 2014 annual report** highlights the TDAFW pump problem and another significant event
at Millstone, a loss of site power that caused a dual reactor trip. NRC inspections following these two events resulted
in one Severity Level III finding, the White finding previously mentioned and
two Green findings. The events and NRC
findings led the NEAC to express “great concern regarding the downward
performance trend” to Dominion and request a formal response from Millstone management
on any root cause that linked the performance problems.
In his
response to the NEAC, the Millstone site VP said there was no root cause
linking events. He also said two safety
culture (SC) improvement areas had been identified, viz., problem
identification and evaluation and establishing clarity around decision making,
and that the site has implemented improvement actions to address those areas. In the Courant article, a plant spokesman is
quoted as saying "If it's not immediately obvious why it's not working, we
put a team to work on it."
The article
also referred to related behind-the-scenes NRC staff emails*** in which the
time it took for Dominion to identify and address the TDAFW pump issue raised
eyebrows at the NRC.
So what
does the TDAFW pump event tell us about SC at Millstone?
Our Perspective
Is
Millstone on the road to the bad old days, when SC was AWOL from the site? We hope not.
And there is some evidence that suggests the TDAFW pump issue was an
isolated problem exacerbated by a bit of bad luck (a vendor supplying the wrong
part with the same part number as the correct part).
Positive
data includes the following: Millstone 2 and 3 both had all green performance
indicators on the 3QTR2014 NRC ROP and, more importantly, a mid-2014 baseline inspection of the Millstone CAP “concluded that Dominion was generally effective in
identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems.”**** In addition, plant “staff expressed a
willingness to use the corrective action program to identify plant issues and
deficiencies and stated that they were willing to raise safety issues.” (p. 10)
Currently, M2
is subject to baseline inspection and M3 to baseline and a supplemental
inspection because of the White finding.
To us, this
doesn’t look like a plant on the road to SC hell although we agree with the NRC
that the TDAFW pump problem took too long to evaluate and resolve.
We hope the
Millstone organization learned more from the TDAFW pump problem than they
displayed in their reply to the NRC.*****
In dealing with the regulator, Millstone naturally tried to bound the
problem and their response: they pointed at the vendor for sending them the wrong
part, implemented a TDAFW pump troubleshooting guide, revised a troubleshooting
procedure, and produced and presented two case studies to applicable plant
personnel.
The site
VP’s letter to NEAC suggests a broader application of the lessons learned. We suggest the “trust but verify” principle
for dealing with vendors be strengthened and that someone be assigned to read
Constance Perin’s Shouldering Risk (see
our Sept. 12, 2011 review) and report back on the ways factors such as accepted
logics, organizational power relations and production pressure can prevent
organizations from correctly perceiving problems that are right in front of
them.
* S. Singer, “Emails Show NRC's Concern Over How Millstone Nuclear Plant Reacted To Malfunction,” Hartford Courant (Jan. 12,
2015).
** 2014 Nuclear Energy Advisory Council (NEAC) Report (Dec. 11, 2014). The Nov. 10,
2014 letter from Millstone site VP S.E. Scace to J.W. Sheehan (NEAC) is
appended to NEAC’s 2014 annual report.
*** The Associated Press obtained the emails
under a Freedom of Information Act request.
Most of the content relates to the evolution of technical issues but, as
cited in the Courant article, there are mentions of Millstone’s slowness in
dealing with the pump issue. The emails
are available at ADAMS ML14358A318 and ML14358A320.
**** “Millstone Power Station – NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000336/2014009 and 05000423/2014009” (Sept. 12, 2014), cover letter. ADAMS ML14255A229.
I worked with the late, great Constance Perin during her research for Shouldering Risks, and I recall she was astonished that nuclear plant cause analysis reports focused on constructed 'facts' and filtered out the information about attitudes and influences found in the interview notes.
ReplyDeleteHow did the nuclear power industry attack on the NRC affect inspector performance?
ReplyDeletehttp://www.epw.senate.gov/105th/col730a.htm
I don't know. Mr. Colvin was unloading on the agency, not the inspectors, so any linkage between Congressional testimony like his and the performance of inspectors in the field would be pure speculation on my part. But he was testifying in 1999 and had good reason to be upset. The SALP and especially the Watch List did have significant subjective qualities. In 1997, 10% of the U.S. nuclear capacity was out of service because of regulatory shutdowns. For additional perspective on this era, see Bob Cudlin's 1998 paper, "Lost Generation." http://powershiftllc.com/PowerShift_LLC/Publications_files/Lost%20Generation.PDF
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