Why is Nuclear Different?

We saw a very interesting observation in a recent World Nuclear News item describing updates to World Association of Nuclear Operators’ structure. The WANO managing director said “Any CEO must ensure their own facilities are safe but also ensure every other facility is safe. [emphasis added] It's part of their commitment to investors to do everything they can to ensure absolute safety and the one CEO that doesn't believe in this concept will risk the investment of every other.” As WNN succinctly put it, “These company heads are hostages of one another when it comes to nuclear safety.”

I think it's true that nuclear operators are joined at the wallet, but why? In most industries, a problem at one competitor creates opportunities for others. Why is the nuclear industry so tightly coupled and at constant risk of contagion? Is it the mystery and associated fears, suspicion and, in some cases, local visibility that attends nuclear?

Coal mining and oil exploration exist in sharp contrast to nuclear. "Everyone knows" coal mining is dirty and dangerous but bad things only happen, with no wide-ranging effects, to unfortunate folks in remote locations. Oil exploration is somewhat more visible: people will be upset for awhile over the recent blow-out in the Gulf of Mexico, offshore drilling will be put on a temporary hold, but things will eventually settle down. In the meantime, critics will use BP as a punching bag (again) but there will be no negative spillover to, say, Chevron.

Self Preservation (MIT #4)

The MIT paper [pg 7] introduces the concept of feedback loops, an essential ingredient of systems dynamics, and critical to understanding the dynamics of safety management.  The MIT authors suggest that there is a “weak balancing loop” associated with individuals responding to a perceived personal threat associated with increased incident rates.  While the authors acknowledge it is a weak feedback, I would add that, at best, it represents an idealized effect and is hard to differentiate from other feedbacks that individuals receive such as management reaction to incidents and pressures associated with cost and plant performance.  The MIT paper [pg 8] goes on to address management actions and states, “When faced with an incident rate that is too high, the natural and most immediately effective response for managers is to focus the blame on individual compliance with rules.”  Note the conditional phrase, “most immediately effective” as it is an example of single loop learning as described in one of my prior posts (MIT #3).  Certainly the fact that procedure adherence is an issue that recurs at many nuclear plants suggests that the “blame game” has limited and short term effectiveness.

My sense is that the self preservation effect is one that exists deeply embedded within the larger safety climate of the organization.  In that climate how strictly is rule adherence observed?  Are procedures and processes of sufficient quality to enhance observance?  If procedures and processes are ambiguous or even incorrect, and left uncorrected, is there a tacit approval of alternate methods?  The reality is self preservation can act in several directions – it may impel compliance, if that is truly the organizational ethic, or it could rationalize non-compliance if that is an organizational expectation.  Life is difficult.