Here We Go Again: NRC to Inspect Nuclear Safety Culture at Entergy’s Pilgrim Plant

Pilgrim

Entergy’s Pilgrim station has been in Column 4 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Action Matrix since September 2015.  Column 4 plants receive more numerous, extensive and intrusive NRC inspections than plants that receive baseline inspections.  Pilgrim is in Column 4 primarily because its Corrective Action Program (CAP) is not effective, i.e., the CAP is not permanently fixing significant plant problems.  Pilgrim’s latest inspection follows NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 95003.  As part of IP 95003 the NRC will assess the plant’s nuclear safety culture (NSC) to ascertain if a weak NSC is contributing to the plant’s inability or unwillingness to identify, specify, investigate and permanently fix problems.*

Our Perspective

Those are the facts.  Now let’s pull on our really tight crankypants.  Entergy is in a race with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to see which fleet operator can get into the most trouble with the NRC over NSC issues.  We reviewed Entergy’s NSC problems at its different plants in our April 13, 2016 post.  Subsequently, the NRC published its report on NSC issues at Entergy’s Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) plant, which also was subject to an IP 95003 inspection.  We reviewed the ANO inspection report on June 16, 2016.  That’s all basically bad news.  However, there is one bit of good news: Entergy recently offloaded one of its plants, FitzPatrick, to Exelon, a proven nuclear enterprise with a good track record. 

Did we mention that Pilgrim is on the industrial equivalent of Death Row?  Entergy has announced its plan to shut down the plant on May 31, 2019.**  Local anti-nuclear activists want it shut down immediately.***  Pilgrim will certainly be under increased NRC scrutiny for the rest of its operating life.  The agency says “Should there be indications of degrading performance, we will take additional regulatory actions as needed, . . . up to and including a plant shutdown order.”****  As readers know, the Safetymatters  founders worked in the commercial nuclear industry and are generally supportive of it.  But maybe it’s time to pull the plug at Pilgrim. 

"Can't anybody here play this game?" — Casey Stengel (1890-1975)

*  “NRC to Perform Wide-Ranging Team Inspection at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant; Review Supports Agency’s Increased Oversight,” NRC press release No. I-16-030 (Nov.  28, 2016).  A.L. Burritt (NRC) to J. Dent (Entergy), “Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station – Notification of Inspection Procedure 95003 Phase ‘C’ Inspection” (Oct. 13, 2016).  ADAMS ML16286A592.

**  “Entergy Intends to Refuel Pilgrim in 2017; Cease Operations on May 31, 2019” (April 14, 2016).  Retrieved Nov. 29, 2016.

***  “Protesters Demand Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant Be Shut Down Now,” CapeCod.com (Nov. 28, 2016).  Retrieved Nov. 29, 2016.

****  “Additional NRC Oversight at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant,” an NRC webpage.  The quote is under the Assessment Results tab.  Retrieved Nov. 29, 2016.

NRC Identifies Nuclear Safety Culture Problems at Watts Bar. What a Surprise.

Watts Bar

A recent NRC inspection report* was very critical of both the Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) and the larger Nuclear Safety Culture (NSC) at the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA’s) Watts Bar plant.  This post presents highlights from the report and provides our perspective on the situation. 

The inspection was a follow-up to a Chilling Effect Letter (CEL)** the NRC issued to Watts Bar in March, 2016.  We reviewed the CEL on March 25, 2016.

The inspection team conducted focus groups and interviews with staff and management.  “. . . the inspection team identified deficiencies in the safety conscious work environment across multiple departments.  Although nearly all employees indicated that they were personally willing to raise nuclear safety concerns, many [nearly half] stated they did not feel free to raise concerns without fear of retaliation.  In addition, most employees did not believe that concerns were promptly reviewed or appropriately resolved, either by their management or via the Corrective Action Program [CAP].” (p. 5) 

While discussing management’s response to the CEL, employees were cautiously optimistic that their work environment would improve although they could not cite any specific examples of improvements.  Management putting their “spin” on the CEL and prior instances of retaliation against employees contribute to a lack of trust between employees and management. (p. 6)

In general, “. . . most employees also noted that there was a strong sense of production over safety throughout the organization. . . . Focus group participants provided examples of disrespectful behavior [by management], intimidation and shopping around work to other employees or contractors who would be less likely to raise issues. . . . all focus groups stated that they could enter issues into the CAP; however, most believed the CAP was ineffective at resolving issues.  The CAP was characterized as a problem identification, but not a problem resolution tool.” (p. 7)

Employees also expressed a lack of confidence in the plant’s Employee Concerns Program. (pp. 7-8)

Our Perspective

The chilled work environment and other NSC issues described in the inspection report did not arise out of thin air.  TVA has a long history of deficient SC at its plants.  Our March 25, 2016 post included a reference to a 2009 NRC Confirmatory Order, still in effect, covering TVA commitments to address past SCWE issues at all three of their nuclear sites.

Browns Ferry, another TVA plant, was a regular character in our 2012 series on the NRC’s de facto regulation of NSC.  As we noted on July 3, 2012 “Browns Ferry has reported SC issues including production and schedule taking priority over safety (2008), “struggling” with SC issues (2010) and a decline in SC (2011).  All of this occurred in spite of multiple licensee interventions and corrective actions.”  As part of their penance, Browns Ferry management made a presentation on their SC improvement actions at the 2014 NRC Regulatory Information Conference.  See our April 25, 2014 post for details.

For a little icing on the nuclear cake, our March 25, 2016 post also summarized the TVA Chief Nuclear Officer’s compensation plan, which doesn’t appear to include any financial incentives for establishing or maintaining a strong NSC.  .

TVA’s less-than-laser focus on safety is also reflected in their non-nuclear activities.  For example, the Dec. 22, 2008 Kingston Fossil Plant coal fly ash slurry spill was the largest such spill in U.S. history.  It was not some “act of God”; neighbors had noticed minor leaks for years and TVA confirmed there had been prior instances of seepage.***  

Bottom line: This unambiguous and complete inspection report includes multiple, significant deficiencies but it’s not new news.

Postscript:  On April 13, 2016 we asked “Is Entergy’s Nuclear Safety Culture Hurting the Company or the Industry?”  We could ask the same question about TVA.  The answer in TVA’s case is “Probably not” primarily because it is a federal corporation and thus is perceived differently from investor-owned nuclear enterprises.  For political reasons, public entities, including TVA and the Department of Energy’s nuclear facilities, are deemed too important to fail.  As a consequence, the bar for tolerable performance is lower and their shortcomings do not appear to infect the perception of private entities that conduct similar activities.


A. Blamey (NRC) to J.W. Shea (TVA), “Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection (Part 1); and Safety Conscious Work Environment Issues of Concern Follow-up; NRC Inspection Report 05000390/2016007 and 05000391/2016007,” (Oct. 26, 2016).  ADAMS ML16300A409.

“Chilled Work Environment for Raising and Addressing Safety Concerns at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant,” (March 23, 2016).  ADAMS ML16083A479.

Wikipedia, “Kingston Fossil Plant coal fly ash slurry spill.”  Retrieved Nov. 11, 2016.

Nuclear Safety Culture in the Latest U.S. Report for the Convention on Nuclear Safety

NUREG-1650 cover

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently published NUREG-1650, rev. 6, the seventh national report for the Convention on Nuclear Safety.*  The report is prepared for the triennial meeting of the Convention and describes the policies, laws, practices and other activities utilized by the U.S. to meet its international obligations and ensure the safety of its commercial nuclear power plants.  Nuclear Safety Culture (NSC) is one of the topics discussed in the report.  This post highlights NSC changes (new items and updates) from the sixth report (NUREG-1650, rev. 5) which we reviewed on March 26, 2014.  The numbers shown below are section numbers in the current report.

8.1.5  International Responsibilities and Activities 

The NRC’s International Regulatory Development Partnership (IRDP) program supports the safe introduction of nuclear power in “new entrant” countries.  IRDP training addresses many topics including safety culture. (p. 99)

8.1.6.2  Human Resources 

This section was updated to include a reference to the 2015 NRC Safety Culture and Climate Survey.

10.1  Background [for article 10, “Priority to Safety”] 

The report notes “All U.S. nuclear power plants have committed to conducting a safety culture self-assessment every 2 years and have committed to conducting monitoring panels as described in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 09-07, “Fostering a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture,” dated March 2014.” (p. 120)  We reviewed NEI 09-07 on Jan. 6, 2011.

10.4  Safety Culture

The bulk of the report addressing NSC is in this section and exhibits a significant rewrite from the previous report.  Some of the changes reorganized existing material but there are also new items, discussed below, and additional background information.  Overall, section 10.4 is more complete and lucid than its predecessor.

10.4.1  Safety Culture Policy Statement

This contains material that formerly appeared under 10.4 and has been expanded to include two new safety culture traits, “questioning attitude” and “decisionmaking.”  The NRC worked with licensees and other stakeholders to develop a common language for discussing and assessing NSC; this effort resulted in NUREG-2165, “Safety Culture Common Language.”  We reviewed NUREG-2165 on April 6, 2014.

10.4.2  NRC Monitoring of Licensee Safety Culture 

This section has been edited to improve clarity and completeness, and provide more specific references to applicable procedures.  For example, IP 95003 now includes detailed guidance for NRC inspectors who conduct an independent assessment of licensee NSC.**

New language specifies interventions the NRC may take with respect to licensee NSC: “These activities range from requesting the licensee perform a safety culture self-assessment to a meeting between senior NRC managers and a licensee’s Board of Directors to discuss licensee performance issues and actions to address persistent and continuing safety culture cross-cutting issues.” (p. 128)

10.4.3 The NRC Safety Culture

This section covers the NRC’s efforts to maintain and enhance its own SC.  The section has been rewritten and strengthened throughout.  It discusses the need for continuous improvement and says “Complacency lends itself to a degradation in safety culture when new information and historical lessons are not processed and used to enhance the NRC and its regulatory products.” (p. 130)  That’s true; SC that is not actively maintained will invariably decay.

12.3.5  Human Factors Information System 

This system handles human performance information extracted from NRC inspection and licensee event reports.  The report notes “the database is being updated to include data with a safety culture perspective.” (p. 146)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

INPO also provides content for the report, basically a description of INPO’s activities to ensure plant safety.  Their discussion includes a section on SC, which is not materially different from their contribution to the previous version of the report.

Our Perspective

Like the sixth national report, this seventh report appears to cover every aspect of the NRC’s operations but does not present any new information.  In other words, it’s a good reference document.

The NSC changes are incremental but move toward increased bureaucratization and intrusive oversight of NSC.  The NRC is certainly showing the hilt of the sword of regulation if not the blade.  We still believe if it reads like a set of requirements, results in enforceable interventions and quacks like the NRC, it’s de facto regulation.


*  NRC NUREG-1650 Rev. 6, “The United States of America Seventh National Report for the Convention on Nuclear Safety” (Oct. 2016).  ADAMS ML16293A104.  The Convention on Nuclear Safety is a legally binding commitment to maintain a level of safety that meets international benchmarks.

**  This detailed guidance is also mentioned in 12.3.6 Support to Event Investigations and For-Cause Inspections and Training (p. 148).

Korean Perspective on Nuclear Safety Culture

Republic of Korea flag

We recently read two journal articles that present the Korean perspective on nuclear safety culture (NSC), one from a nuclear research institute and the other from the Korean nuclear regulator.  Selected highlights from each article are presented below, followed by our perspective on the articles’ value.

Warning:  Although the articles are in English, they were obviously translated from Korean, probably by a computer, and the translation is uneven.  However, the topics and references (including IAEA, NRC, J. Reason and Schein) will be familiar to you so with a little effort you can usually figure out what the authors are saying.

Korean NSC Situation and Issues*

The author is with the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute.  He begins by describing a challenge facing the nuclear industry: avoiding complacency (because plant performance has been good) when the actual diffusion of NSC attributes among management and workers is unknown and major incidents, e.g., Fukushima, point to deficient NSC has a major contributor.  One consequence of this situation is that increased regulatory intervention in licensee NSC is a clear trend. (pp. 249, 254)

However, different countries have differing positions on how to intervene in or support NSC because (1) the objectification of an essentially qualitative factor is necessarily limited and (2) they fear diluting the licensee’s NSC responsibilities and/or causing unintended consequences. 

The U.S. NRC’s NSC history is summarized, including how NSC is addressed in the Reactor Oversight Process and relevant supplemental inspection procedures.  The author’s perception is “If safety culture vulnerability is judged to seriously affect the safety of a nuclear power plant, NRC orders the suspension of its operation, based on the judgment.” (p. 254)  In addition, the NRC has “developed and has been applying a licensee safety culture oversight program, based on site-stationed inspector's observation and assessment . . .” (ibid.)

The perception that the NRC would shut down a plant over NSC issues is a bit of a stretch.  While the agency is happy to pile on over NSC shortcomings when a plant has technical problems (see our June 16, 2016 post on ANO) it has also wrapped itself in knots to rationalize the acceptability of plant NSC in other cases (see our Jan. 30, 2013 post on Palisades).   

There is a passable discussion of the methods available for assessing NSC, ranging from observing top management leadership behavior to taking advantage of “Big data” approaches.  However, the author cautions against reliance on numeric indicators; they can have undesirable consequences.  He observes that Europe has a minimal number of NSC regulations while the U.S. has none.  He closes with recommendations for the Korean nuclear industry.

Regulatory Oversight of NSC**

The authors are with the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, the nuclear regulatory agency.  The article covers their philosophy and methods for regulating NSC.  It begins with a list of challenges associated with NSC regulatory oversight and a brief review of international efforts to date.  Regulatory approaches include monitoring onsite vulnerabilities (U.S.), performing standard reviews of licensee NSC evaluations (Canada, Korea) and using NSC indicators (Germany, Finland) although the authors note such indicators do not directly measure NSC. (pp. 267-68)

In the Korean view, the regulator should perform independent oversight but not directly intervene in licensee activities.  NSC assessment is separate and different from compliance-based inspection, requires effective two-way communications (i.e., a common language) and aims at creating long-term continuous improvement. (pp. 266-67)  Their NSC model uses a value-neutral definition of NSC (as opposed to strong vs. weak); incorporates Schein’s three levels; includes individuals, the organization and leaders; and emphasizes the characteristics shared by organization members.  It includes elements from IAEA GSR Part 2, the NRC, J. Reason's reporting culture, DOE, INPO, just culture and Korea-specific concerns about economics trumping safety. (pp. 268-69)***

In the detailed description of the model, we were pleased to see “Incentives, sanctions, and rewards correspond to safety competency of individuals.”  (p. 270)  An organization’s reward system has always been a hot-button issue for us; all nuclear organizations claim to value NSC, few are willing to pay for achieving or maintaining it.  Click the “Compensation” label to see all our posts on this topic.

The article presents a summary of an exercise to validate the model, i.e., link model components to actual plant safety performance.  The usual high-level mumbo-jumbo is not helped by the rough spots in the translation.  Inspection results, outage rates, scrams, incidents, unplanned shutdowns and radiation doses were claimed to be appropriately correlated with NSC model components.

There should be no surprise that the model was validated.  Getting a “right” answer is obviously good for the regulator.  We routinely express some skepticism over studies that validate models when we can’t see the actual data and we don’t know if the analysis was independently reviewed by anyone who actually understands or cares about the subject matter.

During the pilot study, several improvement areas in Korean NPP's safety culture were identified.  The approach has not been permanently installed.

Our Perspective

These articles are worth reading just to get a different, i.e., non-U.S., perspective on regulatory evaluation of (and possible intervention in) licensee SC.  It’s also worthwhile to get a non-U.S. perspective on what they think is going on in U.S. nuclear regulatory space.  Their information sources probably include a June 2015 NRC presentation to Korean regulators referenced in our Aug. 24, 2015 post.  

It’s interesting that Europe has some regulations that focus on ongoing communications with the licensees.  In contrast, the U.S. has no regulations but an approach that can stretch like a cheap blanket to cover all possible licensee situations.

Afterword

We haven’t posted for awhile.  It’s not because we’ve lost interest but there hasn’t been much worth reporting.  The big nuclear news in the U.S. is not about NSC, rather it’s about plants being scheduled for shutdown because of their economics.  International information sources have not been offering up much either.  For example, the LinkedIn NSC forum has pretty much dried up except for recycled observations and consultants’ self-serving white papers.


*  Y-H Lee, “Current Status and Issues of Nuclear Safety Culture,” Journal of the Ergonomics Society of Korea vol. 35 no. 4 (Aug 2016) 247-261.

**  YS Choi, SJ Jung and YH Chung, “Regulatory Oversight of Nuclear Safety Culture and the Validation Study on the Oversight Model Components,” Journal of the Ergonomics Society of Korea vol. 35 no. 4 (Aug 2016) 263-275.

***  Korea has had problems, mentioned in both articles, caused by deficient NSC.  Also see our Aug. 7, 2013 post for related information.

Nuclear Safety Culture Self-Assessment Guidance from IAEA

IAEA report cover

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently published guidance on performing safety culture (SC) self-assessments (SCSAs).  This post summarizes the report* and offers our perspective on its usefulness.

The Introduction presents some general background on SC and specific considerations to keep in mind when conducting an SCSA, including a “conscious effort to think in terms of the human system (the complex, dynamic interaction of individuals and teams within an organization) rather than the technological system.” (p. 2)  Importantly, an SCSA is not based on technical skills or nuclear technology, nor is it focused on immediate corrective actions for observed problems.

Section 2 provides additional information on SC, starting with the basics, e.g., culture is one way of explaining why things happen in organizations.  The familiar iceberg model is presented, with the observable artifacts above the surface and the national, ethnic and religious values that underlie culture way below the waterline.  Culture is robust (it cannot be changed rapidly) and complicated (subcultures exist).  So far, so good.

Then things start to go off the rails.  The report reminds us that the IAEA SC framework** has five SC characteristics but then the report introduces, with no transition, a four-element model for envisioning SC; naturally, the model elements are different from the five SC characteristics previously mentioned.  The report continues with a discussion of IAEA’s notion of “shared space,” the boundary area where working relationships develop between the individual and other organizational members.  We won’t mince words: the four-component model and “shared space” are a distraction and zero value-added.

Section 3 explores the characteristics of SCSAs.  Initially, an SCSA focuses on developing an accurate description of the current culture, the “what is.”  It then moves on to evaluating a SC’s strengths and weaknesses by comparing “what is” with “what should be.”  An SCSA is different from a typical audit in numerous ways, including the need for specialized training, a focus on organizational dynamics and an understanding of the complex interplay of multicultural dimensions of the organization.

SCSAs require recognition of the biases present when a culture examines itself.  Coupling this observation with an earlier statement that effective SCSAs require understanding of the relevant social sciences, the report recommends obtaining qualified external support personnel (at least for the initial efforts at conducting SCSAs).  In addition, there are many risks (the report comes up with 17) associated with performing an SCSA that have to be managed.  All of these aspects are important and need to be addressed.

Section 4 describes the steps in performing an SCSA.  The figure that purportedly shows all the steps is unapproachable and unintelligible.  However, the steps themselves—prepare the organization, the team and the SCSA plan; conduct the pre-launch and the SCSA; analyze the results; summarize the communicate the findings; develop actions; capture lessons learned; and conduct a follow-up—are reasonable.

The description of SCSA team composition, competences and responsibilities is also reasonable.  Having a team member with a behavioral science background is highly desirable but probably not available internally in other than the largest organizations. 

Section 5 covers SCSA methods: document review, questionnaires, observations, focus groups and interviews.  For each method, the intent, limitations and risks, and intended uses are discussed.  Each method requires specific skills.  The purpose is to develop an overall view of the culture.  Because of the limitations of individual methods, multiple (and preferably all) methods should be used.  Overall, this section is a pretty good high-level description of the different investigative methods.

Section 6 describes how to perform an integrated analysis of the information gathered.  This involves working iteratively with parallel information sets.  There is a lengthy discussion of how to develop cultural themes from the different data sources.  Themes are combined into an overall descriptive view of the culture which can then be compared to the IAEA SC framework (a normative view) to identify relative strengths and weaknesses, and improvement opportunities.

Section 7 describes approaches to communicating the findings and transitioning into action.  It covers preparing the SCSA report, communicating the results to management and the larger organization, possible barriers to implementing improvement initiatives and maintaining continuous improvement in an organization’s SC.

The report has an extensive set of appendices that illustrate how an SCSA can be conducted.  Appendix I is a laundry list of potential areas for inquiry.  Appendices II-VIII present a case study using all the SCSA methods in Section 5, followed by some example overall conclusions.  Appendix IX is an outline of an SCSA final report.  The guidance on using the SCSA methods is acceptably complete and clear.

A 28-page Annex (including 8 pages of references) describes the social science underlying the recommended methodology for performing SCSAs.  It covers too much ground to be summarized here.  The writing is uneven, with some topics presented in a fluid style (probably a single voice) while others, especially those referring to many different sources, are more ragged.  Because of the extensive use of in-line references, the reader can easily identify source materials.   

Our Perspective

There’s good news and bad news in this Safety Report.  The good news is that when IAEA collates and organizes the work of others, e.g., academics, SC practitioners or industry best practices, IAEA can create a readable, reasonably complete reference on a subject, in this case, SCSA.

The bad news is that when IAEA tries to add new content with their own concepts, constructs, figures and such, they fail to add any value.  In fact, they detract from the total package.  It seems to never have occurred to the IAEA apparatchiks to circulate their ideas for new content for substantive review and comment.


*  International Atomic Energy Agency, “Performing Safety Culture Self-assessments,” Safety Reports Series no. 83 (Vienna: IAEA, 2016).  Thanks to Madalina Tronea for publicizing this report.  Dr. Tronea is the founder/moderator of the LinkedIn Nuclear Safety Culture discussion group.

**  Interestingly, the IAEA SC framework (SC definition, key characteristics and attributes) is mentioned without much discussion; the reader is referred to other IAEA documents for more details.  That’s OK.  For purposes of SCSA, it’s only important that the organization, including the SCSA team, agree on a SC definition and its associated characteristics and attributes.  This will give everyone involved a shared normative view for linking the SCSA findings to a picture of what the SC should look like.

Nuclear Safety Culture at ANO—the NRC Weighs In

Arkansas Nuclear One (credit: Edibobb)

On June 25, 2015 we posted about Arkansas Nuclear One’s (ANO) performance problems (a stator drop, inadequate flood protection and unplanned scrams) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC's) reaction.  The NRC assigned ANO to column 4 of the Action Matrix where it receives the highest level of oversight for an operating plant.  As part of this increased oversight, the NRC conducted a comprehensive inspection of ANO performance, programs and processes.  A lengthy inspection report* was recently issued.

According to the NRC press release** the inspection team identified the following major issues:

“Resource reductions and leadership behaviors were the most significant causes for ANO’s declining performance. . . . ANO management did not reduce workloads through efficiencies or the elimination of unnecessary work, . . . Leaders . . . did not address expanding work backlogs***. . . . An unexpected increase in employee attrition between 2012 and 2014 caused a loss in experienced personnel, . . . Since 2007, the reduced resources created a number of changes that slowly began to impact equipment reliability.  The Entergy fleet reduced preventive maintenance and extended the time between some maintenance activities.”

The press release goes on to list numerous ANO corrective actions and NRC observations that suggest the potential for improved plant performance.

What About ANO’s Safety Culture?

The press release also mentions that the inspection team evaluated the adequacy of a 2015 Third Party Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment (TPNSCA) conducted at ANO.  The press release gives short shrift to the key role a weak safety culture (SC) played in creating ANO’s problems in the first place and the extensive SC questions raised and diagnostics performed by the NRC inspection team.

Last June, based on NRC and ANO meeting presentations, we concluded “the ANO culture endorses a “blame the contractor” attitude, accepts incomplete investigations into actual events and potential problems, and is content to let the NRC point out problems for them.”  These are serious deficiencies.  Do the same or similar problems appear in the inspection report?  To answer that question, we need to dig into the details of the 243 page report.

The Cover Letter

Top-level SC problems are included in the NRC cover letter which says “The inspection team identified what it considered to be missed opportunities for ANO to have promptly initiated performance improvements since being placed in Column 4.  More specifically, ANO: 1) was slow to implement corrective actions to address the findings from the Corrective Action Program cause evaluation and the Third Party Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment; 2) did not perform an evaluation of the causes for safety culture problems; . . .” (letter, p. 2)

Executive Summary

The report's Executive Summary says “The Third Party Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment identified that ANO personnel tolerated, and at times normalized, degraded conditions.”  Expanding on the missed opportunities comment in the cover letter, “the NRC team’s independent safety culture evaluation noted limited improvement in safety culture since the completion of ANO’s independent Third Party Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment.” (report p. 5)  “ANO did not create a specific improvement plan to address the findings of the safety culture assessments, choosing to address selected safety culture attributes that were associated with root cause evaluations rather than treating the findings in the context of a separate problem area.  By not performing a cause evaluation for safety culture, ANO management missed the opportunity to address the full scope of safety culture weaknesses.” (pp. 5-6)

Review of ANO Recovery Plan 

The NRC’s critique of ANO’s Recovery Plan included “The NRC team questioned the recovery team’s decision not to perform casual evaluations of the PAs [Problem Areas].  In response, ANO performed apparent cause evaluations (ACEs) or gap analyses for each PA.  The NRC team questioned the recovery team’s decision not to perform causal evaluations for the safety culture attributes identified in [a 2014] . . . safety culture survey, the TPNSCA, and the RCEs [Root Cause Evaluations].  The team also questioned the recovery team’s decision not to treat safety culture as a separate problem area.” (p. 21)

This is an example where the NRC was still identifying ANO’s overarching problems for the plant staff.

Review of RCEs for Fundamental Problem Areas

“ANO’s Vendor Oversight RCE identified weak implementation of administrative controls and placing undue confidence in vendor services as common cause failures. However, ANO did not assess the underlying safety culture aspects.” (p. 110, emphasis added)

This is not “blame the vendor” but is a different serious problem, viz., an over-reliance on vendor activities to protect the customer.  (This problem is not unique to ANO; it also might exist at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.  See our May 3, 2016 post for details.)

Inspection Report Chapter on SC

The NRC team conducted its own assessment of ANO’s SC. The NRC team interviewed personnel at all levels, conducted focus group discussions, performed behavioral observations, reviewed documents and relevant plant programs, and evaluated plant management meetings.  Overall, they assessed all ten SC traits using the full set of SC attributes contained in NRC documentation.  For each trait, the report includes its attributes, inspection team observations and findings, and relevant ANO corrective actions.

The team also reviewed seven RCEs and concluded ANO addressed the major SC attributes identified in each RCE.  However, “The NRC team noted that ANO identified that some safety culture attributes were contributors to several of the RCE problem statements, but ANO did not consider the collective significance.” (p. 184)

ANO took the hint.  “In response to the NRC team’s concerns, ANO performed a common cause analysis of all of the safety culture attributes that were identified in the recovery RCEs in order to assess the collective significance and causes.” (p. 185)  ANO developed a SC Area Action Plan (AAP) and the NRC concluded “The corrective actions identified in the NSC AAP were comprehensive and appropriate to address the causes for safety culture weaknesses.” (p. 186)

“The NRC team’s graded safety culture assessment independently confirmed the results from the TPNSCA.” (p. 188)

“The NRC team was concerned that the SCLT’s [Safety Culture Leadership Team, senior managers] conclusion that ANO’s safety culture was “adequate” in August 2015 did not appropriately reflect the data provided by, or the recommendations from, the NSCMP [Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel, mid-level personnel].  This SCLT conclusion did not reflect the declining condition with respect to safety culture and indicated a lack of awareness that improvements in safety culture at ANO were needed.”  The SCLT eventually came around and in December 2015 declared that ANO’s SC was not acceptable. (p. 192)

Our Perspective

The NRC is optimistic that ANO has correctly identified the root causes of its performance problems and has undertaken corrective actions that will ultimately prove effective.  We hope so but we’ll go with “trust but verify” on this one.  ANO still exhibits problems with incomplete analyses and leaning on the NRC to identify systemic deficiencies.

The NRC team took a good look at ANO's SC.  Quite frankly, their effort was more comprehensive than we expected.  They used an acceptable methodology for their SC assessment.  The fact that their assessment findings were consistent with the TPNSCA is not surprising.  SC evaluation is a robust social science activity and qualified SC evaluators using similar techniques should obtain generally comparable results.

We believe the NRC’s SC professionals are qualified and competent but probably encouraged to support the overall inspection findings.  The elephant in the room is that SC is a policy, not a regulation.  Would the NRC keep a plant in column 4 based solely on their belief that the plant SC is deficient?  Look at the contortions the agency performed at Palisades as that plant’s SC somehow went from weak, with constant problems, to “improving” and, we inferred, acceptable.  (See our Jan. 30, 2013 post for details.)

There may have been a bit of similar magical thinking at ANO.  In the inspection report, every SC trait had examples of shortcomings but also had “appropriate” corrective actions to improve performance.****  How can this be when ANO (and Entergy) have been so slow to grasp the systemic nature of their SC problems?

Let’s close on a different note.  Earlier this year ANO named a full-time SC manager, a person whose background is in plant security.  On the surface, this is an “unfiltered” choice.  (See our March 10, 2016 post for a discussion of filtering in personnel decisions.)  He may be exactly the type of person ANO needs to make SC improvements happen.  We wish him well.


*  M. L. Dapas (NRC) to J. Browning (ANO), “Arkansas Nuclear One – NRC Supplemental Inspection Report 05000313/2016007 and 05000368/2016007” (June 9, 2016).  ADAMS ML16161B279.

**  V. Dricks, Press Release, “NRC Issues Comprehensive Inspection Report on Arkansas Nuclear One” (June 13, 2015).

***  We have often noted that large backlogs, especially of safety-related work, are an artifact of a weak SC.

****  One trait was judged to have no significant issues so corrective action was not needed.

The Criminalization of Safety (Part 3)

Our Perspective

The facts and circumstances of the events described in Table 1 in Part 1 point to a common driver - the collision of business and safety priorities, with safety being compromised.  Culture is inferred as the “cause” in several of the events but with little amplification or specifics.^[1]  The compromises in some cases were intentional, others a product of a more complex rationalization.  The events have been accompanied by increased criminal prosecutions with varied success. 

We think it is fair to say that so far, criminalization of safety performance does not appear to be an effective remedy.  Statutory limitations and proof issues are significant limitations with no easy solution. The reality is that criminalization is at its core a “disincentive”.  To be effective it would have to deter actions or decisions that are not consistent with safety but not create a minefield of culpability.  It is also a blunt instrument requiring rather egregious behavior to rise to the level of criminality.  Its best use is probably as an ultimate boundary, to deter intentional misconduct but not be an unintended trap for bad judgment or inadequate performance.  In another vein, criminalization would also seem incompatible with the concept of a “just culture” other than for situations involving intentional misconduct or gross negligence.

Whether effective or not, criminalization reflects the urgency felt by government authorities to constrain excessive risk taking, intentional or not, and enhance oversight.  It is increasingly clear that current regulatory approaches are missing the mark.  All of the events catalogued in Table 1 occurred in industries that are subject to detailed safety and environmental regulation.  After the fact assessments highlight missed opportunities for more assertive regulatory intervention, and in the Flint cases there are actual criminal charges being applied to regulators.  The Fukushima event precipitated a complete overhaul of the nuclear regulatory structure in Japan, still a work in progress.  Post hoc punishments, no matter how severe, are not a substitute.

Nuclear Regulation Initiatives

Looking specifically at nuclear regulation in the U.S. we believe several specific reforms should be considered. It is always difficult to reform without the impetus of a major safety event, but we could see these actions as ones that could appear obvious in a post-event assessment if there was ever an “O-ring” moment in the nuclear industry.^[2]

1. The NRC should include the safety management system in its regulatory activities.

The NRC has effectively constructed a cordon sanitaire around safety management by decreeing that “management” is beyond the scope of regulation.  The NRC relies on the fact that licensees bear the primary responsibility for safety and the NRC should not intrude into that role.  If one contemplates the trend of recent events scrutinizing the performance of regulators following safety events, this legalistic “defense” may not fare well in a situation where more intrusive regulation could have made the difference.

The NRC does monitor “safety culture” and often requires licensees to address weaknesses in culture following performance issues.  In essence safety culture has become an anodyne for avoiding direct confrontation of safety management issues.  Cynically one could say it is the ultimate conspiracy - where regulators and “stakeholders” come together to accept something that is non-contentious and conveniently abstract to prevent a necessary but unwanted (apparently by both sides) intrusion into safety management.

As readers of this blog know, our unyielding focus has been on the role of the complex socio-technical system that functions within a nuclear organization to operate nuclear plants effectively and safely.  This management system includes many drivers, variables, feedbacks, culture, and time delays in its processes, not all of which are explicit or linear.  The outputs of the system are the actions and decisions that ultimately produce tangible outcomes for production and safety.  Thus it is a safety system and a legitimate and necessary area for regulation.

NRC review of safety management need not focus on traditional management issues which would remain the province of the licensee.  So organizational structure, personnel decisions, etc. need not be considered.^[3]  But here we should heed the view of Daniel Kahneman where he suggests we think of organizations as “factories for producing decisions” and therefore, think of decisions as a product.  (See our Nov. 4,2011 post, A Factory for Producing Decisions.)  Decisions are in fact the key product of the safety management system.  Regulatory focus on how the management system functions and the decisions it produces could be an effective and proactive approach.

We suggest two areas of the management system that could be addressed as a first priority: (1) Increased transparency of how the management system produces specific safety decisions including the capture of objective data on each such decision, and (2) review of management compensation plans to minimize the potential for incentives to promote excessive risk taking in operations.

2. The NRC should require greater transparency in licensee management decisions with potential safety impacts.

Managing nuclear operations involves a continuum of decisions balancing a variety of factors including production and safety.  These decisions may occur with individuals or with larger groups in meetings or other forums.  Some may involve multiple reviews and concurrences.  But in general the details of decision making, i.e., how the sausage is made, are rarely captured in detail during the process or preserved for later assessment.^[4]  Typically only decisions that happen to yield a bad outcome (e.g., prompt the issuance of an LER or similar) become subject to more intensive review and post mortem.  Or actions that require specific, advance regulatory approval and require an SER or equivalent.^[5]  

Transparency is key.  Some say the true test of ethics is what people do when no one is looking.  Well the converse of that may also be true - do people behave better when they know oversight is or could be occurring?  We think a lot of the NRC’s regulatory scheme is already built on this premise, relying as it does on auditing licensee activities and work products.

Thinking back to the Davis Besse example, the criminal prosecutions of both the corporate entity and individuals were limited to providing false or incomplete information to the NRC.  There was no attempt to charge on the basis of the actual decisions to propose, advocate for, and attempt to justify, that the plant could continue to operate beyond the NRC’s specified date for corrective actions.  The case made by First Energy was questionable as presented to the NRC and simply unjustified when accounting for the real facts behind their vessel head inspections.

Transparency would be served by documenting and preserving the decision process on safety significant issues.  These data might include the safety significance and applicable criteria, the potential impact on business performance (plant output, cost, schedule, etc), alternatives considered, and the participants and their inputs to the decision making process, and how a final decision was reached.   These are the specifics that are so hard or impossible to reproduce after the fact.^[6]  The not unexpected result: blaming someone or something but not gaining insight into how the management system failed.

This approach would provide an opportunity for the NRC to audit decisions on a routine basis.  Licensee self assessment would also be served through safety committee review and other oversight including INPO.  Knowing that decisions will be subject to such scrutiny also can promote careful balancing of factors in safety decisions and serve to articulate how those balances are achieved and safety is served.  Having such tangible information shared throughout the organization could be the strongest way to reinforce the desired safety culture.

3. As part of its regulation of the safety management system, the NRC should restrict incentive compensation for nuclear management that is based on meeting business goals.

We started this series of posts focusing on criminalization of safety.  One of the arguments for more aggressive criminalization is essentially to offset the powerful pull of business-based incentives with the fear of criminal sanctions.  This has proved to elusive.  Similarly attempting to balance business incentives with safety incentives also is problematic.  The Transocean experience illustrates that quite vividly.^[7]

Our survey several years ago of nuclear executive compensation indicated (1) the amounts of compensation are very significant for the top nuclear executives, (2) the compensation is heavily dependent on each year’s performance, and (3) business performance measured by EPS is the key to compensation, safety performance is a minor contributor.  A corollary to the third point might be that in no cases that we could identify was safety performance a condition precedent or qualification for earning the business-based incentives. (See our July 9, 2010 post, Nuclear Management Compensation (Part 2)).  With 60-70% of total compensation at risk, executives can see their compensation, and that of the entire management team, impacted by as much as several million dollars in a year.  Can this type of compensation structure impact safety?  Intuition says it creates both risk and a perception problems.  Virtually every significant safety event in Table 1 has reference to the undue influence of production priorities on safety.  The issue was directly raised in at least one nuclear organization^[8] which revised its compensation system to avoid undermining safety culture. 

We believe a more effective approach is to minimize the business pressures in the first place.  We believe there is a need for a regulatory policy that discourages or prohibits licensee organizations from utilizing significant incentives based on financial performance.  Such incentives invariably target production and budget goals as they are fundamental to business success.  To the extent safety goals are included they are a small factor or based on metrics that do not reflect fundamental safety.  Assuring safety is the highest priority is not subject to easily quantifiable and measurable metrics - it is judgmental and implicit in many actions and decisions taken on a day-to-day basis at all levels of the organization.  Organizations should pay nuclear management competitively and generously and make informed judgments about their overall performance.

Others have recognized the problem and taken similar steps to address it.  For example, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 the Federal Reserve Board has been doing some arm twisting with U.S. financial services companies to adjust their executive compensation plans - and those plans are in fact being modified to cap bonuses associated with achieving performance goals. (See our April 25, 2013 post, Inhibiting Excessive Risk Taking by Executives.)

Nick Taleb (of Black Swan fame) believes that bonuses provide an incentive to take risks.  He states, “The asymmetric nature of the bonus (an incentive for success without a corresponding disincentive for failure) causes hidden risks to accumulate in the financial system and become a catalyst for disaster.”  Now just substitute “nuclear operations” for “the financial system”.

Central to Taleb’s thesis is his belief that management has a large informational advantage over outside regulators and will always know more about risks being taken within their operation. (See our Nov. 9, 2011 post, Ultimate Bonuses.)  Eliminating the force of incentives and providing greater transparency to safety management decisions could reduce risk and improve everybody’s insight into those risks deemed acceptable.

Conclusion

In industries outside the commercial nuclear space, criminal charges have been brought for bad outcomes that resulted, at least in part, from decisions that did not appropriately consider overall system safety (or, in the worst cases, simply ignored it.)  Our suggestions are intended to reduce the probability of such events occurring in the nuclear industry.

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^[1] It raises the question whether anytime business priorities trump safety it is a case of deficient culture.  We have argued in other blog posts that sufficiently high business or political pressure can compromise even a very strong safety culture.  So reflexive resort to safety culture may be easy but not be very helpful.

^[2] Credit to Adam Steltzner author of The Right Kind of Crazy recounting his and other engineers’ roles in the design of the Mars rovers.  His reference is to the failure of O-ring seals on the space shuttle Challenger.

^[3] We do recognize that there are regulatory criteria for general organizational matters such as for the training and qualification of personnel. 

^[4] In essence this creates a “safe harbor” for most safety judgments and to which the NRC is effectively blind.

^[5] In Davis Besse much of the “proof” that was relied on in the prosecutions of individuals was based on concurrence chains for key documents and NRC staff recollections of what was said in meetings.  There was no contemporaneous documentation of how First Energy made its threshold decision that postponing the outage was acceptable, who participated, and who made the ultimate decision.  Much was made of the fact that management was putting great pressure on maintaining schedule but there was no way to establish how that might have directly affected decision making.

^[6] Kahneman believes there is “hindsight bias”.  Hindsight is 20/20 and it supposedly shows what decision makers could (and should) have known and done instead of their actual decisions that led to an unfavorable outcome, incident, accident or worse.  We now know that when the past was the present, things may not have been so clear-cut.  See our Dec.18, 2013 post, Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman.

^[7] Transocean, owner of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, awarded millions of dollars in bonuses to its executives after “the best year in safety performance in our company’s history,” according to an annual report…’Notwithstanding the tragic loss of life in the Gulf of Mexico, we achieved an exemplary statistical safety record as measured by our total recordable incident rate and total potential severity rate.’”  See our April 7, 2011 post for the original citation in Transocean's annual report and further discussion.

^[8] “The reward and recognition system is perceived to be heavily weighted toward production over safety”.  The reward system was revised "to ensure consistent health of NSC”.  See our July 29, 2010 post, NRC Decision on FPL (Part 2).