Showing posts with label Systems View. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Systems View. Show all posts

Friday, December 10, 2021

Prepping for Threats: Lessons from Risk: A User’s Guide by Gen. Stanley McChrystal.

Gen. McChrystal was a U.S. commander in Afghanistan; you may remember he was fired by President Obama for making, and allowing subordinates to make, disparaging comments about then-Vice President Biden.  However, McChrystal was widely respected as a soldier and leader, and his recent book* on strengthening an organization’s “risk immune system” caught our attention.  This post summarizes its key points, focusing on items relevant to formal civilian organizations.

McChrystal describes a system that can detect, assess, respond to, and learn from risks.**  His mental model consists of two major components: (1) ten Risk Control Factors, interrelated dimensions for dealing with risks and (2) eleven Solutions, strategies that can be used to identify and address weaknesses in the different factors.  His overall objective is to create a resilient organization that can successfully respond to challenges and threats. 

Risk Control Factors

These are things under the control of an organization and its leadership, including physical assets, processes, practices, policies, and culture.

Communication – The organization must have the physical ability and willingness to exchange clear, complete, and intelligible information, and identify and deal with propaganda or misinformation.

Narrative – An articulated organizational purpose and mission.  It describes Who we are, What we do, and Why we do it.  The narrative drives (and we’d say is informed by) values, beliefs, and action.

Structure – Organizational design defines decision spaces and communication networks, implies power (both actual and perceived authority), suggests responsibilities, and influences culture.

Technology – This is both the hardware/software and how the organization applies it.  It include an awareness of how much authority is being transferred to machines, our level of dependence on them, our vulnerability to interruptions, and the unintended consequences of new technologies.

Diversity – Leaders must actively leverage different perspectives and abilities, inoculate the organization against groupthink, i.e., norms of consensus, and encourage productive conflict and a norm of skepticism.  (See our June 29, 2020 post on A Culture that Supports Dissent: Lessons from In Defense of Troublemakers by Charlan Nemeth.)

Bias – Biases are assumptions about the world that affect our outlook and decision making, and cause us to ignore or discount many risks.  In McChrystal’s view “[B]ias is an invisible hand driven by self-interest.” (See our July 1, 2021 and Dec.18, 2013 posts on Daniel Kahneman’s work on identifying and handling biases.) 

Action – Leaders have to proactively overcome organizational inertia, i.e., a bias against starting something new or changing course.  Inertia manifests in organizational norms that favor the status quo and tolerate internal resistance to change.

Timing – Getting the “when” of action right.  Leaders have to initiate action at the right time with the right speed to yield optimum impact.

Adaptability – Organizations have to respond to changing risks and environments.  Leaders need to develop their organization’s willingness and ability to change.

Leadership – Leaders have to direct and inspire the overall system, and stimulate and coordinate the other Risk Control Factors.  Leaders must communicate the vision and personify the narrative.  In practice, they need to focus on asking the right questions and sense the context of a given situation, embracing the new before necessity is evident. (See our Nov. 9, 2018 post for an example of effective leadership.)

Solutions

The Solutions are strategies or methods to identify weaknesses in and strengthen the risk control factors.  In McChrystal’s view, each Solution is particularly applicable to certain factors, as shown in Table 1.

Assumptions check – Assessment of the reasonableness and relative importance of assumptions that underlie decisions.  It’s the qualitative and quantitative analyses of strengths and weaknesses of supporting arguments, modified by the judgment of thoughtful people.

Risk review – Assessment of when hazards may arrive and the adequacy of the organization’s preparations.

Risk alignment check – Leaders should recognize that different perspectives on risks exist and should be considered in the overall response.

Gap analysis – Identify the space between current actions and desired goals.

Snap assessment – Short-term, limited scope analyses of immediate hazards.  What’s happening?  How well are we responding?

Communications check – Ensure processes and physical systems are in place and working.

Tabletop exercise – A limited duration simulation that tests specific aspects of the organization’s risk response.

War game (functional exercise) – A pressure test in real time to show how the organization comprehensively reacts to a competitor’s action or unforeseen event.

Red teaming – Exercises involving third parties to identify organizational vulnerabilities and blind spots.

Pre-mortem – A discussion focusing on the things mostly likely to go wrong during the execution of a plan. 

After-action review – A self-assessment that identifies things that went well and areas for improvement.


 


Table 1  Created by Safetymatters

 

Our Perspective

McChrystal did not invent any of his Risk Control Factors and we have discussed many of these topics over the years.***  His value-add is organizing them as a system and recognizing their interrelatedness.  The entire system has to perform to identify, prepare for, and respond to risks, i.e., threats that can jeopardize the organization’s mission success.

This review emphasizes McChrystal’s overall risk management model.  The book also includes many examples of risks confronted, ignored, or misunderstood in the military, government, and commercial arenas.  Some, like Blockbuster’s failure to acquire Netflix when it had the opportunity, had poor outcomes; others, like the Cuban missile crisis or Apollo 13, worked out better.

The book appears aimed at senior leaders but all managers from department heads on up can benefit from thinking more systematically about how their organizations respond to threats from, or changes in, the external environment. 

There are hundreds of endnotes to document the text but the references are more Psychology Today than the primary sources we favor.

Bottom line: This is an easy to read example of the “management cookbook” genre.  It has a lot of familiar information in one place.

 

*  S. McChrystal and A. Butrico, Risk: A User’s Guide (New York: Portfolio) 2021.  Butrico is McChrystal’s speechwriter.

**  Risk to McChrystal is a combination of a threat and one’s vulnerability to the threat.  Threats are usually external to the organization while vulnerabilities exist because of internal aspects.

***  For example, click on the Management or Decision Making labels to pull up posts in related areas.

Friday, May 21, 2021

Healthcare Safety Culture and Interventions to Reduce Preventable Medical Errors

HSS OIG report cover

We have previously written about the shocking number of preventable errors in healthcare settings that result in injury or death to patients.  We have also discussed the importance of a strong safety culture (SC) in reducing healthcare error rates.  However, after 20 years of efforts, the needle has not significantly moved on overall injuries and deaths.  This post reviews healthcare’s concept of SC and research that ties SC to patient outcomes.  We offer our view on why interventions have not been more effective.

Healthcare’s Model of Safety Culture

Healthcare has a model for SC, shown in the SC primer on the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) Patient Safety Network website.*  The model contains these key cultural features:

  • acknowledgment of the high-risk nature of an organization's activities and the determination to achieve consistently safe operations
  • a blame-free environment** where individuals are able to report errors or near misses without fear of reprimand or punishment
  • encouragement of collaboration across ranks and disciplines to seek solutions to patient safety problems
  • organizational commitment of resources to address safety concerns.

We will critique this model later.

Healthcare Providers Believe Safety Culture is Important

A U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HSS) report*** affirms healthcare providers’ belief that SC is important and can contribute to fewer errors and improved patient outcomes.

AHRQ administers the Patient Safety Organization (PSO) program which gathers data on patient safety events from healthcare providers.  In 2019, the HSS Office of Inspector General surveyed hospitals and PSOs to identify the PSO program’s value and challenges.  SC was one topic covered in the survey and the results confirm SC’s importance to providers.  “Among hospitals that work with PSOs, 80 percent find that feedback and analysis on patient safety events have helped prevent future events, and 72 percent find that such feedback has helped them understand the causes of events.” (p. 10)  Furthermore, “Nearly all (95 percent) hospitals that work with a PSO found that their PSOs have helped improve the culture of safety at their facilities.  A culture of safety is one that enables individuals to report errors without fear of reprimand and to collaborate on solutions.” (p. 11) 

Healthcare Research Connects SC to Interventions to Reduced Errors

AHRQ publishes the “Making Healthcare Safer” series of reports, which represent summaries of important research on selected patient safety practices (PSPs).  The most recent (2020) edition**** recognizes SC as a cross-cutting practice, i.e., SC impacts the effectiveness of many specific PSPs. 

The section on cross-cutting practices begins by noting that healthcare is trying to learn from the experience of high reliability organizations (HROs).  HROs have many safety-enhancing attributes included committed leaders, a SC where staff identify and correct all deviations that could lead to unsafe conditions, an environment where adverse events or near misses are reported without fear of blame or recrimination, and practices to identify a problem’s scope, root causes, and appropriate solutions. (p. 17-1) 

The report identified several categories of practices that are used to improve healthcare SC: Leadership WalkRounds, Team Training, Comprehensive Unit-based Safety Programs (CUSP), and interventions that implemented multiple methods. (p. 17-13)

WalkRounds “involves leaders “walking around” to engage in face to face, candid discussions with frontline staff about patient safety incidents or near-misses.” (p. 17-16)  Team training programs focus on enhancing teamwork skills and communication between healthcare providers . . .” (p. 17-17)  CUSP is a multi-step program to assess, intervene in, and reassess a healthcare unit’s SC. (p. 17-19)

The report also covers 17 specific areas where harm/errors can occur and highlights SC aspects associated with two such areas: developing rapid response teams and dealing with alarm fatigue in hospitals. 

Rapid response teams (RRTs) treat deteriorating hospital patients before adverse events occur. (p. 2-1)  Weak SC and healthcare hierarchies are barriers to successful implementation of RRTs. (p. 2-10)

Alarm fatigue occurs because of high exposure to medical device alarms, many of which are loud or false alarms, that lead to desensitization, missed alarms or delayed responses. (p. 13-1)  The cultural aspects of interventions focused on all staff members (not just nurses) assuming responsibility for addressing alarms. (p. 13-6) 

Our Perspective

We have three problems with healthcare’s efforts to reduce harm to patients: (1) the quasi-official healthcare mental model of safety culture is incomplete, (2) healthcare’s assumption that it can model itself on HROs ignores a critical systemic difference, and (3) an inadequate overall system model leads to fragmented, incremental improvement projects.

An inadequate model for SC

Healthcare does not have an adequate understanding of the necessary attributes of a strong SC.  

The features listed in the introduction of this post are necessary but not sufficient for a strong SC.  SC is more than good communications; it is part of the overall cultural system.  This system has feedback loops that can reinforce or extinguish attitudes and behaviors.  The attitudes of people in the system are heavily influenced by their trust in management to do the right thing.  Management’s behavior is influenced by their goals, policy constraints, environmental pressures, and incentives, including monetary compensation.

Top-to-bottom decision making in the system needs to be consistent, which means processes, priorities, practices, and rules should be defined and followed.  Goal conflicts must be consistently handled.  Decision makers must be identified to allow accountability.   Problems must be identified (without retribution except for cause), analyzed, and permanently fixed.

Lack of attention to the missing attributes is one reason that healthcare SC has been slow to strengthen and unfavorable patient outcomes are still at unacceptable levels. 

Healthcare is not a traditional HRO

The healthcare system looks to HROs for inspiration on SC but does not recognize one significant difference between a traditional HRO and healthcare.

When we consider other HROs, e.g., nuclear power plants, off-shore drilling operations, or commercial aviation, we understand that they have significant interactions with their respective environments, e.g., regulators, politicians, inspectors, suppliers, customers, activists, etc. 

Healthcare is different because its customers are basically the feedstock for the “factory” and healthcare has to accept those inputs “as is”; in other words, unlike a nuclear power plant, healthcare cannot define and enforce a set of specifications for its inputs.  The inputs (patients) arrive in a wide range of “as is” conditions, from simple injuries to multiple, interacting ailments.  The healthcare system has to accomplish two equally important objectives: (1) correctly identify a patient’s problem(s) and (2) fix them in a robust, cost-effective manner.  SC in the first phase should focus on obtaining the correct diagnosis; SC in the second phase should focus on performing the prescribed corrective actions according to approved procedures, and ensuring that expected results occur. 

Inadequate models lead to piecemeal interventions      

Healthcare’s simplistic mental model for SC is part of an inaccurate mental model for the overall system.  The current system model is fragmented and leads researchers and practitioners to think small (on silos) when they could be thinking big (on the enterprise).  An SC intervention that focuses on tightening process controls in one small area cannot move the needle on system-wide SC or overall patient outcomes.  For more on systems models, systemic challenges, and narrow interventions, see our Oct. 9, 2019 and Nov. 9,2020 posts.  Click on the healthcare label below to see all of the related posts.

Bottom line: Healthcare SC can have a direct impact on the probabilities that specific harms will occur, and their severity if they do but accurate models of culture are essential. 

 

*  Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Culture of Safety” (Sept. 2019).  Accessed May 4, 2021.  AHRQ is an organization within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  Its mission includes producing evidence to make health care safer.

**  The “blame-free” environment has evolved into a “just culture” where human errors, especially those caused by the task system context, are tolerated but taking shortcuts and reckless behavior are disciplined.  Click on the just culture label for related posts.

***  U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, “Patient Safety Organizations: Hospital Participation, Value, and Challenges,” OEI-01-17-00420, Sept. 2019.

****  K.K. Hall et al, “Making Healthcare Safer III: A Critical Analysis of Existing and Emerging Patient Safety Practices,” AHRQ Pub. No. 20-0029-EF.  (Rockville, MD: AHRQ) March 2020.  This is a 1400 page report so we are only reporting relevant highlights.


Monday, December 14, 2020

Implications of Randomness: Lessons from Nassim Taleb

Most of us know Nassim Nicholas Taleb from his bestseller The Black Swan. However, he wrote an earlier book, Fooled by Randomness*, in which he laid out one of his seminal propositions: a lot of things in life that we believe have identifiable, deterministic causes such as prescient decision making or exceptional skills, are actually the result of more random processes. Taleb focuses on financial markets but we believe his observations can refine our thinking about organizational decision making, mental models, and culture.

We'll begin with an example of how Taleb believes we misperceive reality. Consider a group of stockbrokers with successful 5-year track records. Most of us will assume they must be unusually skilled. However, we fail to consider how many other people started out as stockbrokers 5 years ago and fell by the wayside because of poor performance. Even if all the stockbrokers were less skilled than a simple coin flipper, some would still be successful over a 5 year period. The survivors are the result of an essentially random process and their track records mean very little going forward.

Taleb ascribes our failure to correctly see things (our inadequate mental models) to several biases. First is the hindsight bias where the past is always seen as deterministic and feeds our willingness to backfit theories or models to experience after it occurs. Causality can be very complex but we prefer to simplify it. Second, because of survivorship bias, we see and consider only the current survivors from an initial cohort; the losers do not show up in our assessment of the probability of success going forward. Our attribution bias tells us that successes are due to skills, and failures to randomness.

Taleb describes other factors that prevent us from being the rational thinkers postulated by classical economics or Cartesian philosophy. One set of factors arises from how are brains are hardwired and another set from the way we incorrectly process data presented to us.

The brain wiring issues include the work of Daniel Kahneman who describes how we use and rely on heuristics (mental shortcuts that we invoke automatically) to make day-to-day decisions. Thus, we make many decisions without really thinking or applying reason, and we are subject to other built-in biases, including our overconfidence in small samples and the role of emotions in driving our decisions. We reviewed Kahneman's work at length in our Dec. 18, 2013 post. Taleb notes that we also have a hard time recognizing and dealing with risk. Risk detection and risk avoidance are mediated in the emotional part of the brain, not the thinking part, so rational thinking has little to do with risk avoidance.

We also make errors when handling data in a more formal setting. For example, we ignore the mathematical truth that initial sample sizes matter greatly, much more than the sample size as a percentage of the overall population. We also ignore regression to the mean, which says that absent systemic changes, performance will eventually return to its average value. More perniciously, ignorant or unethical researchers will direct their computers to look for any significant relationship in a data set, a practice that can often produce a spurious relationship because all the individual tests have their own error rates. “Data snoops” will define some rule, then go looking for data that supports it. Why are researchers inclined to fudge their analyses? Because research with no significant result does not get published.

Our Perspective

We'll start with the obvious: Taleb has a large ego and is not shy about calling out people with whom he disagrees or does not respect. That said, his observations have useful implications for how we conceptualize the socio-technical systems in which we operate, i.e., our mental models, and present specific challenges for the culture of our organizations.

In our view, the three driving functions for any system's performance over time are determinism (cause and effect), choice (decision making), and probability. At heart, Taleb's world view is that the world functions more probabilistically than most people realize. A method he employs to illustrate alternative futures is Monte Carlo simulation, which we used to forecast nuclear power plant performance back in the 1990s. We wanted plant operators to see that certain low-probability events, i.e., Black Swans**, could occur in spite of the best efforts to eliminate them via plant design, improved equipment and procedures, and other means. Some unfortunate outcomes could occur because they were baked into the system from the get-go and eventually manifested. This is what Charles Perrow meant by “normal accidents” where normal system performance excursions go beyond system boundaries. For more on Perrow, see our Aug. 29,2013 post.

Of course, the probability distribution of system performance may not be stationary over time. In the most extreme case, when all system attributes change, it's called regime change. In addition, system performance may be nonlinear, where small inputs may lead to a disproportionate response, or poor performance can build slowly and suddenly cascade into failure. For some systems, no matter how specifically they are described, there will inherently be some possibility of errors, e.g., consider healthcare tests and diagnoses where both false positives and false negatives can be non-trivial occurrences.

What does this mean for organizational culture? For starters, the organization must acknowledge that many of its members are inherently somewhat irrational. It can try to force greater rationality on its members through policies, procedures, and practices, instilled by training and enforced by supervision, but there will always be leaks. A better approach would be to develop defense in depth designs, error-tolerant sub-systems with error correction capabilities, and a “just culture” that recognizes that honest mistakes will occur.

Bottom line: You should think awhile about how many aspects of your work environment have probabilistic attributes.

 

* N.N. Taleb, Fooled by Randomness, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House) 2004.

** Black swans are not always bad. For example, an actor can have one breakthrough role that leads to fame and fortune; far more actors will always be waiting tables and parking cars.

Monday, November 9, 2020

Setting the Bar for Healthcare: Patient Care Goals from the Joint Commission

Joint Commission HQ
The need for a more effective safety culture (SC) in the field of healthcare is acute: every year tens of thousands of patients are injured or unnecessarily die while in U.S. hospitals. The scope of the problem became widely known known with the publication of “To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System”* in 2000. This report included two key observations: (1) the cause of the injuries and deaths is not bad people in health care, rather the people are working in bad systems that need to be made safer and (2) legitimate liability concerns discourage the reporting of errors, which means less feedback to the system and less learning from mistakes.

It's 20 years later. Is the healthcare system safer than it was in 2000? Yes. Is safety performance at a satisfactory level? No.

For evidence, we need look no further than a Nov. 18, 2019 blog post** byDr. Mark Chassin, president and CEO of the Joint Commission (JC), the entity responsible for establishing standards for healthcare functions and patient care, and evaluating, accrediting, and certifying healthcare organizations based on their compliance with the standards.

Dr. Chassin summarized the current situation as follows: “The health care industry has directed a substantial amount of time, effort, and resources at solving the problems, and we have seen some progress. That progress has typically occurred one project at a time, with hard-working quality professionals applying a “one-size-fits-all” best practice to address each problem. The resulting improvements have been pretty modest, difficult to sustain, and even more difficult to spread.”

Going forward, he says the industry can make substantial progress by committing to zero harm, overhauling the organizational culture, and utilizing proven process improvement techniques. He singles out the aviation and nuclear power industries for having similar commitments.

But achieving substantial, sustained improvement is a big lift. To get a feel for how big, let's look at the 2020 goals and strategies the JC has established for patient care in hospitals, in other words, where the performance bar is set today.*** We will try to inform your own judgment about their scope and sufficiency by comparing them with corresponding activities in the nuclear power industry.

1. Identify patients correctly by using at least two ways to identify them.

This is a major challenge in a hospital where many patients are entering and leaving the system every day, being transferred to and from different departments, and being treated by multiple individuals who have different roles and ranks, and are treating patients at different levels of intensity for different periods of time. There is really no analogue in the closed, controlled personnel environment of a power plant.

2. Improve staff communication by getting important test results to the right staff person on time.

This should be a familiar challenge to people in any organization, including a power plant, where functions may exist in different organizational silos with their own procedures, vocabulary, and priorities.

3. Use medicines safely by labeling medicines that are not labeled, taking extra care with patients on blood thinners, and managing patients' medicine records for accuracy, completeness, and possible interactions.

This is similar to requirements to accurately label, control, and manage the use of all chemicals used in an industrial facility.

4. Use alarms safely by ensuring that alarms on medical equipment are heard and responded to on time.

In a hospital, it is a problem when multiple alarms are going off at the same time, with differing degrees of urgency for personnel attention and response. In power plants, operators have been known to turn off alarms that are reporting too many false positives. These situations call out for operating and maintenance standards and practices that ensure all activated alarms are valid and deserving of a response.

5. Prevent infection by adhering to Centers for Disease Control or World Health Organization hand cleaning guidelines.

The aim is to keep bad bugs from circulating. Compare this prctice to the myriad procedures, personnel, and equipment dedicated to ensuring nuclear power plant radioactivity is kept in an identified, controlled, and secure environment.

6. Identify patient safety risks by reducing the risk for suicide.

Compare this with the wellness, fitness for duty, and behavioral observation programs at every nuclear power plant.

7. Prevent mistakes in surgery by making sure that the correct surgery is done on the correct patient and at the correct place on the patient’s body, and pausing before the surgery to make sure that a mistake is not being made.

This is similar to tailgate meetings before maintenance activities and using the STAR (Stop-Think-Act-Review) approach before and during work. Think of the potential for error in mirror-image plants; people are bi-lateral but subject to the similar risks.

Our Perspective

The JC's set of goals is thin gruel to show after 20 years. In our view, efforts to date reflect two major shortcomings: a lack of progress in defining and strengthening SC, and a lack of any shared understanding of what the relevant system consists of, how it functions, and how to improve it.

Safety Culture

Our July 31, 2020 post on When We Do Harm by Dr. Danielle Ofri discussed the key attributes for a strong healthcare SC, i.e., one where the probability of errors is much lower than it is today. In Ofri's view, the primary cultural attribute for reducing errors is a willingness of individuals to assume ownership and get the necessary things done, even if it's not in their specific job description, amid a diffusion of responsibility in their task environment. Secondly, all members of the organization, regardless of status, should have the ability (or duty even) to point out problems and errors without fear of retribution. The culture should regard reporting an adverse event as a routine and ordinary task. Third, organizational leaders, including but not limited to senior managers, must encourage criticism, forbid scapegoating, and not allow hierarchy and egos to overrule what is right and true. There should be deference to proven expertise and widely held authority to say “stop” when problems become apparent.

The Healthcare System

The healthcare system includes the providers, the supporting infrastructure, external environmental factors, e.g., regulators and insurance companies, the patients and their families, and all the interrelationships and dynamics between these components. An important dynamic is feedback, where the quality and quantity of output from one component influences performance in other system components. System dynamics create homeostasis, fluctuations, and all levels of performance from superior to failure. Other organizational variables, e.g., management decision-making practices and priorities, and the compensation scheme, provide context for system functioning. For more on system attributes, please see our Oct.9, 2019 post or click the healthcare label.

Bottom line: Compare the JC's efforts with the vast array of safety and SC-related policies, procedures, practices, activities, and dedicated personnel in your workplace. Healthcare has a long way to go.


* Institute of Medicine (L.T. Kohn et al), “To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System” (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press) 2000. Retrieved Nov. 5, 2020.

** M. Chassin, “To Err is Human: The Next 20 Years,” blog post (Nov. 18, 2019).  Retrieved Nov. 1, 2020.

*** The Joint Commission, “2020Hospital National Patient Safety Goals,” simplified version (July, 2020). Retrieved Nov. 1, 2020.


Tuesday, August 25, 2020

How to Consider Unknown Unknowns: Hints from McKinsey

Our July 31, 2020 post on medical errors discussed the importance of the “differential diagnosis” where a doctor thinks “I believe this patient has X but what else could it be?” We can usually consider that as a decision situation with known unknowns, i.e., looking for another needle in a haystack based on the available evidence. But what if you don’t know what you don’t know? How do you create other possibilities, threats or opportunities, or different futures out of thin air? A 2015 McKinsey article* provides some suggestions for getting started. There is nothing really new but it reiterates some important points we have been making here on Safetymatters.

The authors begin by noting executives’ decision making processes often coalesce around “managing the probable,” i.e., attempting to fit a current decision into a model that has worked before. The questions they ask and the data they seek tend to narrow, not expand, the decision and its context. This is an efficient way to approach many everyday decisions but excessively simple models are not appropriate for complicated decisions like how to approach a changing market or define a market that does not yet exist. All models constrain the eventual solution and simple models constrain it the most, perhaps leading to a totally wrong answer.

Decision situations that are dramatically different, complex, and uncertain require a more open-ended approach, the authors call it “leading the possible.” In such situations, decision makers should acknowledge they don’t know how uncertain environmental conditions will unfold or complex systems will evolve. The authors propose three non-traditional mental habits to identify and explore the possibilities.

Ask different questions

Ask questions that open up possibilities rather than narrowing the discussion and constraining the solution. Sample questions include: What do I expect not to find? How could I adjust to the unexpected? What might I be discounting or explaining away too quickly? What would happen if I changed one or more of my core assumptions? We would add: Is fear of missing out prodding me to move too rashly or complacency allowing me to not move at all?

As Hans Rosling said: “Beware of simple ideas and simple solutions. . . . Welcome complexity.” (see our Dec. 3, 2018 post)

Take multiple perspectives

Decision makers, especially senior managers, need to escape the echo chamber of the sycophants who surround them. They should consider how people who are very different from themselves might view the same decision situation. They can consult people who are knowledgeable but frustrating or irritating, or outside their usual internal circle such as junior staff, or even dissatisfied customers. Such perspectives can be insightful and surprising.

Other thought leaders have suggested similar approaches. For example, Ray Dalio proposes thoughtful disagreement where decision makers seek out brilliant people who disagree with them to gain a deeper understanding of decision situations (see our April 17, 2018 post) or Charlan Nemeth on the usefulness of authentic dissent in decision situations (see our June 29, 2020 post).

Recognize systems

The authors’ appreciation for systems thinking mirrors what we’ve been saying for years. (For example, see our Jan. 6, 2017 post.) Decision makers should be looking at the evolution of the forest, not examining individual trees. We need to acknowledge and accept that “Elements in a system can be connected in ways that are not immediately apparent.” The widest view is the most powerful but people have “been trained to follow our natural inclination to examine the component parts. We assume a straightforward and linear connection between cause and effect. Finally, we look for root causes at the center of problems. In doing these things, we often fail to perceive the broader forces at work.”


The authors realize that leaders who can apply the new habits may have different attributes than earlier senior managers. Traditional leaders are clear, confident, and decisive. However, their preference for managing the probable leaves them more open to being blindsided. In contrast, new leaders need to exhibit “humility, a keen sense of their own limitations, an insatiable curiosity, and an orientation to learning and development.”

Our Perspective

This article promotes more expansive mental models for decision making in formal organizations, models that deemphasize reliance on reductionism and linear, cause-effect thinking. We applaud the authors’ intent.

McKinsey is pretty good at publishing small bite “news you can use” articles. However, they do not contain any of the secret sauce for which McKinsey charges its clients top dollar.

Bottom line: Some of you don’t want to read 300 page books on management so here’s an 8 page article with a few good points.


* Z. Achi and J.G. Berger, “Delighting in the Possible,” McKinsey Quarterly (March 2015).